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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant Victor Orvis ("Mr. Orvis"), a defendant in a u'm;nut; pu> 
Fourth Judicial District Court, I Jiah i 'ouniy, Suit11 ul I luili, An • * = ^ • >rk Department, 
appeals (mm lln l\ liimh I lift \ H flit district court entered on March 23, 2005, [R. 418], 
finding Mr. Orvis guilty on five criminal counts of operating a business without a license 
in violation of Section 5.04.030 of the Municipal Lode I •.-. : ; , 
"Ordinance"). 
} IV < >rvis linu-K filed a Notice of Appeal on April 12, 2005 from the district 
court's Minute Entry. [R. 425-26.] 
On April 20, 2005, the district court signed a copy +-
. ond Notice of Appeal from the signed 
Minute Entry. k.-+37-39.] 
The signed Minute Entry is a final decision in a criminal case, and lln: Second 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed. I his ( until fu\ iiirisdiclnm ui this appeal pursuant to 
HltilH i K„k" $ /XO.i ^l/Xr) Additionally, this Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code § 78-5-120(7) because the district court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Ordinance as applied i >wuth Salt Lake 
City v. Terkelsori .'(HIM'I * IT "<l1 II i»I P.3d282, 284. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue Number 1(a): Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's 
motion to dismiss the charges against him based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution when the clear weight of the evidence in the record established 
that the Ordinance under which Mr. Orvis was prosecuted was selectively enforced 
against him by Pleasant Grove City (the "City")? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 103-04; R. 144-46; R. 270-76.] 
Whether the ordinance was selectively enforced against Mr. Orvis in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is a question of law which 
this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). 
Issue Number 1(b): Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's 
motion to dismiss the charges against him based on Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution when the clear weight of the evidence in the record established that the 
Ordinance under which Mr. Orvis was prosecuted was selectively enforced against him 
by the City? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 103-04; R. 144-46; R. 270-76.] 
Whether the ordinance was selectively enforced against Mr. Orvis in violation of 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution is a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. See State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). 
2 
Issue Number 2(a): Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's 
motion to dismiss the charges against him when, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and applicable federal case law, the district court 
applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether Mr. Orvis satisfied the second-
prong of his selective enforcement claim by requiring Mr. Orvis to prove the City's 
actions were invidious or in bad faith and were based on impermissible considerations 
such as the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights instead of requiring Mr. 
Orvis to prove the City's actions were either irrational and wholly arbitrary or based upon 
the City's animosity toward him? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 144-46; R. 271-74.] 
Whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard is a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt 
Lake City. 2004 UT App 436,17, 104 P.3d 646, 650. 
Issue Number 2(b): Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's 
motion to dismiss the charges against him when, contrary to Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution and applicable Utah case law, the district court applied the wrong legal 
standard to determine whether Mr. Orvis satisfied the second-prong of his selective 
enforcement claim by requiring Mr. Orvis to prove the City's actions were invidious or in 
bad faith and were based on impermissible considerations such as the desire to prevent 
the exercise of constitutional rights instead of requiring Mr. Orvis to prove the City's 
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actions were either irrational and wholly arbitrary or based upon the City's animosity 
toward him? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 144-46; R. 271-74.] 
Whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard is a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt 
Lake City, 2004 UT App 436,1f 7, 104 P.3d 646, 650. 
Issue Number 3(a): Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's 
motion to dismiss the charges against him when the district court's underlying factual 
findings, on their face, contradict the district court's legal conclusion? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 382; R. 405-06; R. 409-15; R. 501, p. 350.] 
The district court's application of the legal standard to the findings of fact is given 
a measure of discretion. State v. Bumingham, 2000 UT App. 229, If 6, 10 P.3d 355, 356-
57. 
Issue Number 3(b): Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's 
motion to dismiss the charges against him when the district court wholly failed to enter 
factual findings that would support the district court's erroneous legal standard or the 
correct legal standard? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 382; R. 409-15; R. 501, p. 350.] 
The district court's application of the legal standard to the findings of fact is given 
a measure of discretion. State v. Bumingham, 2000 UT App. 229, % 6, 10 P.3d 355, 356-
4 
57. 
Issue Number 4: Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Orvis's motion 
to dismiss the charges against him when the district court's factual findings supporting 
the denial are clearly erroneous because there is legally insufficient evidence to support 
the findings and the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence in the record? 
This issue was preserved. [R. 382; R. 409-15; R. 501, p. 350.] 
The district court's underlying factual findings supporting its denial generally are 
reviewed for whether they are clearly erroneous. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 
(Utah 1995). However, this Court should apply a less deferential standard in this case 
because the district court mechanically adopted the City's proposed findings verbatim, 
and never articulated the steps by which it reached its conclusion that the City did not 
selectively enforce the ordinance against Mr. Orvis. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 
1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Bover Co. v. LignelL 567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977); State v. 
Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 
477-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
ORDINANCES 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
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Pleasant Grove, Utah, Muni. Code ch. 5.04, § 030 (2000): "It is unlawful 
for any person,... to engage in business . . . without first obtaining a 
business license . . . to violate any provision or fail to comply with all of the 
appropriate provisions of this Chapter and any violation or failure to comply 
with any provision of this Chapter shall be punishable as a Class B 
misdemeanor and a civil fine may be assessed . . . . " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal challenges the district court's denial of Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss 
the criminal charges against him and subsequent entry of a final judgment that Mr. Orvis 
was guilty of five counts of operating a business without a license in violation of the 
Ordinance.1 
Mr. Orvis is a resident of Pleasant Grove, Utah, and has been intermittently 
operating a metal prototype fabricating business, named Design Fabricators, out of his 
home in Pleasant Grove since 1997. [R. 360; R. 394-95.] On November 21, 2001, the 
City cited Mr. Orvis for operating a business without a license during the period 
November 1999 through March 2001. [R. 5; R. 20-21.] On January 31, 2002, Stephen H. 
Schreiner, a Provo City prosecutor,2 filed a six count information against Mr. Orvis in the 
!Mr. Orvis was originally charged with six counts of operating a business without a 
license. [R. 20-21.] The City voluntarily dismissed the first count because the statute of 
limitations had run. [R. 500, p. 30.] 
apparently, the City's Prosecutor, Mrs. Christine M. Petersen ("Ms. Peterson" or 
"Tina Peterson" or "City Prosecutor"), had previously removed herself from this matter as 
a result of a conflict created by a civil lawsuit which Mr. Orvis had filed against the City. 
[See R. 500, p. 32.] Despite her official removal, Ms. Peterson was actively involved in 
the prosecution of this case. [See e ^ , R. 500, pgs. 34, 46, 73-75, 158, 213, 215, 220, 
227.] 
6 
Pleasant Grove Justice Court based on that citation. [R. 20-21.] The Justice Court 
convicted Mr. Orvis on August 28, 2002, [R. 1], and he timely appealed the conviction to 
the Fourth District Court on September 12, 2002. [R. 23.] 
After entering a plea of not guilty on April 1, 2003 and requesting a jury trial, [R. 
43], Mr. Orvis filed a motion to dismiss all charges on October 10, 2003. [R. 98] Mr. 
Orvis's motion to dismiss was based, in part, on the assertion that the City had selectively 
enforced the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. [R. 
102-03.] On April 14, 2004, Mr. Orvis also filed a motion to suppress the evidence on 
the grounds the City conducted a warrantless search of his property in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. [R. 195-211.] 
The district court, after holding evidentiary hearings on both of Mr. Orvis's 
motions, [R. 500, pgs. 67-230; R. 501, pgs. 243-345], held a hearing on December 10, 
2004 at which the district court ruled from the bench denying both of Mr. Orvis's 
motions. [R. 501, p. 346.] The district court gave no reason for his ruling other than "I 
agree with the City" and "it comes down to whether . . . [Mr. Orvis] was singled out on 
[his] motion to dismiss, and the other I think the case law was in their favor in the motion 
to suppress." [R. 501, pgs. 346-47.] The district court requested the City to prepare the 
findings to support the ruling but wholly failed to give the City any direction relative to 
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the findings. The only direction the Court gave the City was to prepare findings on the 
"suppression," the "open fields," the selective "prosecution," and "also the equal 
protection argument." [R. 501, p. 348.] The district court also directed the City to give 
Mr. Orvis a chance to respond to the proposed findings. [Id.] 
Mr. Orvis, after he received the City's proposed findings, filed objections to those 
proposed findings and requested a hearing to more particularly detail his objections. [R. 
382.] However, without setting a hearing relative to those objections, the district court, 
on February 15, 2005, signed the City's proposed findings, adopting them verbatim. [R. 
389.] Subsequently, on February 23, 2005, the district court held a hearing where the 
court told Mr. Orvis, without any opportunity for argument, that the court was going to 
sign the City's proposed findings. [R. 501, p. 350.] The district court entered the 
findings that same day, [R. 395], and Mr. Orvis filed detailed objections to those findings 
on February 25, 2005. [R. 396-415.] 
Without conducting any further evidentiary proceedings, the district court found 
Mr. Orvis guilty on five counts of operating a business without a license in violation of 
the Ordinance and entered a Minute Entry reflecting that finding. [R. 418; R. 420; R. 
501, p. 371.] On April 20, 2005, the district court signed the Minute Entry. [R. 434-35.] 
Mr. Orvis timely appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss and 
conviction for operating a business without a license. [R. 425-26; 437-39.] 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The City Requested 300 Pleasant Grove Residents to Apply for a 
Business License by August 3,2001 or Face Criminal Citation; Most 
People, Including Mr. Orvis, Did Not Comply by That Date. 
On July 19, 2001, Mrs. Emery, the City's Business Licensing Official, [R. 500, p. 
134], sent a form letter to approximately 300 residents3 who had a business listed with the 
Utah State Tax Commission as an active sales tax outlet (the "Tax list"), but did not have 
a Pleasant Grove business license (the "list of 300").4 [R. 279; R. 448, Ex. 4.] Mr. Orvis 
received one of those letters relative to his business, Design Fabricators. [R. 305.] In 
pertinent part, the letter stated: 
If our records are incorrect, please notify this office; if not, then a 
completed application, together with the appropriate fees, must be 
submitted to the [City].... We request that you take care of this matter to 
be in compliance with city ordinances. It is a Class B misdemeanor to 
operate a business without a license. If you do not respond within fifteen 
(15) days, this matter will be forwarded to our city attorney. No further 
notification will be sent. 
3The City's records reflect that the City sent the letter to 296 residents/businesses, 
271 of which were on the Tax list and 25 who were not. [R. 281-309.] However, for 
purposes of this appeal, Mr. Orvis will use the number 300 because that was the number 
of letters claimed by the City to have been sent to individuals on the Tax list. [R. 279.] 
4According to the City's records, as of February 27, 2001, approximately 389 out 
of 608 Pleasant Grove businesses had not applied for a 2001 business license and were 
therefore potentially operating a business without a license. [R. 292-309; R. 313.] The 
summary ledger sheets of the City's business license records which contain that 
information, [R. 292-309], have the following headings: (a) "On Mail List" designates 
Pleasant Grove residents who were on a regular business mailing list for the City; and (b) 
"On P.G. 300 List" designates Pleasant Grove residents who received the City's July 19, 
2001 letter. 
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[R. 448, Ex. 4.] No further letters were sent to the 300. [R. 135; R. 137; R. 279.] 
Only 3 people from the list of 300 applied for a business license by August 3, 
2001, the date on which the City was to forward all people in violation of the business 
license ordinance to the City Prosecutor.5 [R. 305-07.] 
B. Mr. Orvis Submitted a Business License Application Well Before 
Others Who Were Similarly Situated, and the City Never Notified Mr. 
Orvis That His Application Was Incorrect, Incomplete or Denied. 
On August 23, 2001, Mr. Orvis filed a business license application with Mrs. 
Emery. [R. 448, Ex. 6; R. 500, p. 90.] The business license application was for a minor 
home occupation permit. [R. 448, Ex. 6.] He was the ninth or tenth person from the list 
of 300 to file an application for a business license.6 [R. 292-309; R. 312.] 
5Those were: Casper Creations, [R. 307], Comfort Cabin, [R. 306], and Customer 
Craft Upholstery. [R. 305.] 
6Between August 3, 2001 and November 8, 2001, 30 people from the list of 300, 
including Mr. Orvis, applied for a business license. Edizone applied for a license on the 
same day as Mr. Orvis. [R. 304.] Five people filed an application the day before, August 
22, 2001: Aspen Dental, [R. 308], Carol Harding, [R. 307], Creative Memories, [R. 306], 
Data Techniques, [R. 305], and Juniper Video. [R. 301.] 
Between September 5, 2001 and November 8, 2001, 23 people applied for a 
business license: Heidi Adkins, Alternative Audio, [R. 309], Apex Adventure, Ronald 
Ashby, [R. 308], Calls Furniture, [R. 307], Cook Appliance, Corporate Sportsware, [R. 
306], Decor Products, Digital Technologies, [R. 305], Happy Valley Snacks, [R. 302], J 
& W Snacks, JP Associates, [R. 301], L & T Trainership, LLoyds Catering, [R. 300], 
Mission Partners, [R. 299], Renslows Consulting, Leann Ressler, Rich Designs, Sage 
Records, [R. 296], SRP Manufacturing [R. 295], Strugis Enterprises, [R. 294], 
Transounds, and Tri D Enterprises. [R. 293] Although Alternative Audio does not have 
an "x" next to its name under the "PG 300 List," [R. 309], Alternative Audio was on the 
City's list of 300. [R. 290.] 
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When Mr. Orvis applied, neither Mrs. Emery nor Mr. Orvis knew for certain 
whether he was required to apply for a major or minor home occupation permit for his 
particular business. [R. 500, pgs. 141-42.] After discussing his business with Mrs. 
Emery, Mr. Orvis decided to apply for a minor home occupation permit. [R. 500, pgs. 89, 
112-14.] Mr. Orvis filled out the application in its entirety except for the applicable zone, 
[R. 448, Ex. 6], which was to be filled out by the zoning officials. [See R. 500, pgs. 110, 
123.] Mrs. Emery accepted the completed application, [R. 500, p. 91], told Mr. Orvis he 
could pay the licensing fee when he returned for the business license, [R. 500, pgs. 109-
10,141-42, 162-63], and forwarded the application to the City's Community 
Development department for approval. [R. 500, pgs. 135, 175-76.] Mrs. Emery never 
told Mr. Orvis his application was incomplete.7 [R. 132; R. 500, pgs. 90, 115.] 
After filing his application, Mr. Orvis was never notified by the City that his 
application would not be approved or that he applied for the wrong permit. [R. 132.] In 
fact, the City never contacted Mr. Orvis to discuss any issues the City had relative to his 
application until January 2002, after he had been criminally cited. [R. 5; R. 132; R. 279.] 
Indeed, on September 26, 2001, Mrs. Emery wrote a letter to Mr. Limb, the City's 
Zoning Administrator, which identified Mr. Orvis's business license application as one of 
7Mrs. Emery's testimony, at most, contradicts itself and discredits her initial 
testimony that she told Mr. Orvis his application was incomplete. [Compare R. 500, pgs. 
140-42 with R. 500, pgs. 151-167.] 
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nine which were waiting for approval.8 [R. 448, Ex. 7.] The letter also identified eight 
other applications that were questionable or that had been placed on hold; Design 
Fabricators - Mr. Orvis's business - was not one of the eight. [Id] These eight 
businesses were identified because "there were things that they hadn't complied with." 
[R.500,pgs. 169-70.] 
One of the eight questionable applications was for a business called Gaylords. [R. 
303; R. 448, Ex. 7.] Gaylords was onthelistof 300. [R. 303.] It had applied for a home 
occupation permit to do "automotive repairs." [R. 448, Ex. 7.] The City, however, had 
decided that an automotive business did "not fall under a minor or major home 
occupation." [Id.] Gaylords, in fact, did not receive a business license in 2001. [R. 303.] 
C. The City Enforced the Ordinance Against Mr. Orvis and Did Not 
Enforce the Ordinance Against a Single Other Person Who Was 
Similarly Situated. 
Sometime between September 24, 2001 and November 21, 2001, the City 
determined Mr. Orvis needed a major home occupation permit rather than the minor 
8On August 29, 2001, Mrs. Emery determined 85 people from the list of 300 either 
had not responded or could not be reached. [R. 279; R. 500, p. 73.] Mr. Orvis was not 
one of those 85 because he had already applied for a license by that time. [R. 500, p. 72.] 
Rather, he was considered by the City to be one of 9 to 12 individuals who had "FILED" 
and were "WAITING FOR APPROVAL ON LICENSE." [R. 279; R. 448, Ex. 7.] No 
one from the list of 300 or the list of 85, other than Mr. Orvis, was ever criminally cited 
and prosecuted. [R. 279; R. 292-309; R. 500, pgs. 72-73, 76.] One person from the list 
of 85 was purportedly issued a "CITATION." [R. 279] However, when questioned by 
the Court, the City admitted the citation identified under the list of 85 was actually "an 
administrative citation . . . f[rom] the Zoning department." [R. 500, p. 76.] 
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permit for which Mr. Orvis had applied. [R. 500, p. 196.] The City's practice when it 
made such a determination was to notify the business of the issue and give the business an 
opportunity to correct the problem before issuing a citation, criminal or otherwise. [R. 
501, p. 310.] 
The City, contrary to its practice, did not notify Mr. Orvis of the City's decision or 
give him an opportunity to resolve the issue. [R. 500 at pgs. 196-97.] Instead, on 
November 21, 2001, the City cited Mr. Orvis for operating a business without a license in 
violation of the Ordinance and ordered Mr. Orvis to cease and desist doing business or 
face further criminal sanctions. [R. 5; R. 312.] The conduct for which Mr. Orvis was 
cited all occurred on or before March 20, 2001, before the City's July 19, 2001 form 
letter. [R. 20-21.] As a result of the citation and criminal prosecution, Mr. Orvis was 
found guilty of 5 class B misdemeanors and was required to pay approximately $1,500.00 
in fines and fees. [R. 312; R. 385; R. 501, pgs. 356-57.] The City's cease and desist 
order ultimately put Mr. Orvis out of business for more than fifteen months. [R. 312.] 
Mr. Orvis was the only person from the list of 300 who was criminally cited and 
prosecuted for operating a business without a license or ordered to cease and desist doing 
business. [R. 279; R. 312; R. 500, p. 206.] At the time Mr. Orvis was criminally cited, at 
least 5 other people on the list of 300 had not yet applied for and/or received a license, but 
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were neither cited nor prosecuted.9 [R. 293; R. 298-99; R. 303.] One of those individuals 
did not apply until December 12, 2001 and was neither cited nor prosecuted. [R. 299.] 
Three of those individuals did not apply until sometime in 2002 and were neither cited 
nor prosecuted. [R. 293; R. 298; R. 303.] The remaining individual, the owner of 
Gaylords, applied for but did not receive a business license in 2001 and was neither cited 
nor prosecuted. [R. 303; R. 448, Ex. 7.]10 
More importantly, in the group of 35 people with whom Mr. Orvis was similarly 
situated - Le^ , those on the list of 300 who did not apply for a license until after the City's 
August 3, 2001 deadline11 - Mr. Orvis was the only one criminally cited, prosecuted and 
fined. [R. 293-96; R. 298-309.]12 No one else in the 35 even received a citation, let alone 
was prosecuted or fined. 
Before and after the criminal citation, Mr. Orvis made inquiries regarding the 
status of his application. [R. 132; R. 500, p. 92.] For example, on January 2, 2002, Mr. 
9Those were: Gaylords, Gooses Kart Shop, [R. 303], Michael Robinson, [R. 299], 
Organize Plus, [R. 298], and Union Chief. [R. 293.] Although Gaylords is listed as not 
having applied at all, [R. 303], it had clearly done so but had not received a license from 
the City. [R. 448, Ex. 7.] 
l0The owner of Gaylords is likely the "one other person," referenced in the district 
court's findings of fact, [R. 394], who never complied with the Ordinance. 
11
 All other people from the list of 300 who are not accounted for above either 
applied for a business license at some unidentified time, were not in violation of the 
City's ordinance for various reasons, or the City was unable to locate them. [R 279.] 
12Only one individual, other than Mr. Orvis, was ever charged a late fee, and that 
fee was only for $51.50. [R. 306.] 
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Orvis wrote the City requesting an official statement concerning the status of his 
application. [R. 448, Ex. 1.] 
On January 4, 2002, the City responded by letter and noted that a "visit [to the] 
property had raised questions about the work being performed," and that "the application 
process was not complete and . . . additional information was needed." [R. 448, Ex. 2.] 
The City requested Mr. Orvis schedule a "full physical inspection of the residence and on-
site buildings" and stated "[i]f that inspection is satisfactory and no other issues are raised 
we can complete the application process." [Id.] The City never told Mr. Orvis which 
additional information was needed or that he needed to apply for a major home 
occupation permit. [IdL; R. 500, pgs. 96, 98.] In response to this letter, Mr. Orvis 
contacted City officials and again told them they could inspect his house for the minor 
home occupation permit. [R. 500, pgs. 99-101, 118-19.] 
Ultimately, the City never approved or denied Mr. Orvis's application. [R. 500, 
pgs. 17, 91-92.] The City later told Mr. Orvis the reason they would not approve his 
application was because of a civil action Mr. Orvis had filed against the City arising out 
of the same facts as this case.13 [R. 500, p. 97.]14 
13In May 2002, Mr. Orvis re-applied for a business license, this time requesting a 
major home occupation permit. [R. 350-51.] The City inspected Mr. Orvis's property 
relative to the major home occupation permit application. [R. 500, p. 119.] 
14Apparently, as a result of the selective enforcement allegations raised by Mr. 
Orvis in this case and his civil case, the City began actively citing and prosecuting 
individuals for doing business without a license in or about May 2002. [R. 322-44.] 
None of the people who were subsequently cited and prosecuted were on the list of 300. 
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D. The City's Deliberate Plan to Treat Mr. Orvis Differently Than Others 
Similarly Situated Included a Campaign of Official Harassment 
Directed Solely Against Mr. Orvis. 
Sometime prior to September 24,2001, City officials - Mayor Ed Sanderson, the 
City Prosecutor, the City Administrator, and Mrs. Emery - held a meeting with Mr. Limb, 
the City's Zoning Administrator relative to Mr. Orvis's business license application. [R. 
500, pgs. 209-11, 219-22.] They notified Mr. Limb that Mr. Orvis had applied for a 
minor home occupation permit and that they believed he "was doing business more than a 
Minor Home Occupation." [Id.] They then requested Mr. Limb to thoroughly inspect 
Mr. Orvis's property. [Id.] It was unusual for these officials to request Mr. Limb to 
inspect a premise simply for a business license application. [R. 500, p. 222.] Indeed, this 
was the first thorough inspection Mr. Limb had ever been instructed to conduct relative to 
a minor or major home occupation permit. [R. 500, p. 187.] 
After being instructed by City officials to inspect Mr. Orvis's property, Mr. Limb 
did not request a police officer to accompany him. [R. 501, pgs. 290-92.] It was not his 
practice to take a police officer with him on such inspections. [R. 500, pgs. 188-89, 223.] 
Mr. Limb, in fact, was not concerned about visiting Mr. Orvis. [R. 501, p. 292.] 
Despite the lack of need for a police escort, sometime prior to September 24,2001, 
the City's Police Captain sent Officer Taufer a memorandum requesting Officer Taufer to 
accompany Mr. Limb "to an illegal business/zoning violation" at Mr. Orvis's residence. 
[R. 500, pgs. 67, 73.] 
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[R. 196.] The visit to Mr. Orvis's residence was to occur on September 24, 2001. [Id.] 
Mr. Limb visited Mr. Orvis's residence on September 24, 2001 to do the requested 
inspection. [R. 448, Ex. 8.] Mr. Orvis invited Mr. Limb into Mr. Orvis's home, [idL; R. 
500, pgs. 181-82], and told Mr. Limb he could conduct an inspection relative to the 
business license application, so long as the inspection was limited to that purpose. [R. 
500, pgs. 99-100; R. 501, p. 282.] Mr. Limb remained in the house for 5 to 10 minutes. 
[R. 500, p. 189.] 
Shortly after Mr. Limb arrived, Officer Taufer drove an unmarked car onto Mr. 
Orvis's driveway and parked behind Mr. Orvis's house. [R. 448, Ex. 8; R. 501, pgs. 254-
55, 266.] Rather than proceeding to the front door, Officer Taufer walked to Mr. Orvis's 
shed, [R. 501, p. 256], which is located at the end of the driveway approximately 100 feet 
behind Mr. Orvis's house. [R. 260; R. 265-269.] Officer Taufer was not in uniform, [R. 
501, pgs 266-70], and neither Mr. Orvis nor Mr. Limb knew Officer Taufer was there at 
this time. [R. 501, pgs. 281, 287.] 
According to Officer Taufer's testimony, an individual walked out toward him 
before he reached the shed. [R. 501, p. 257.] The individual identified himself to Officer 
Taufer as Mr. Orvis's son. [Id.] Officer Taufer did not identify himself as a police 
officer. [R. 501, pgs. 267-70.] Officer Taufer asked Mr. Orvis's son whether he worked 
for his father and what kind of work went on in the shed. [R. 224; R. 501, p. 258.] Mr. 
Orvis's son replied he did work for his father and that the shed now was mostly used for 
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small custom fabricating jobs. [Id.] 
Officer Taufer then walked back to Mr. Orvis's front door where Mr. Orvis saw 
Officer Taufer for the first time. [R. 501, p. 281.] Alarmed that a police officer was 
apparently accompanying Mr. Limb on a search of the residence, [R. 500, p. 190], Mr. 
Orvis declined Mr. Limb's request to search the shed, [id.], and Officer Taufer and Mr. 
Limb left the property. [R. 500, p. 183.] 
On October 4, 2001, Mr. Limb wrote a letter to the City Prosecutor, detailing his 
meeting with Mr. Orvis and outlining the action he now planned to take, including: 
• [0]btain from the city office the sales tax records where Mr. Orvis 
remitted sales tax to the State on hopefully how long . . . Mr. Orvis 
has been remitting sales tax. 
• [T]ry to find customers who have had work done by Mr. Orvis and if 
they know where the design (proto type) was manufactured. 
• [F]ind out from the power company when Mr. Orvis had electricity 
run to the shed and if it has a separate meter for the shed. 
• [D]iscuss this matter with the Police and Tina to see if we have 
enough information to proceed. 
[R. 448, Ex. 8.] 
Mr. Limb testified that: (a) he seldom, if ever, sent this type of letter to the City 
Prosecutor relative to business license problems, [R. 500, pgs. 217-18]; (b) normally, if 
Mr. Limb rejected a business license application after an inspection, then he would simply 
notify Mrs. Emery of that fact for her to determine whether or not to deny the application, 
[R. 500, p. 218]; and (c) he has never gone to this extent 1o gather information on a 
business license application either before or after this instance. [R. 500, p. 229]. 
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E. The City's Selective Treatment of Mr. Orvis Was Motivated by the 
City's Animosity Toward Him for the Political Views He Expressed 
While a Member of the City's Planning Commission. 
Mr. Orvis was singled out by City officials for enforcement of the Ordinance 
because he vocally opposed high-density housing while he was a member of the City's 
Planning Commission. [R. 277; R. 312.] Mr. Orvis's opposition to high-density housing 
conflicted with the position taken by Mayor Ed Sanderson. [R. 277.] This conflict 
resulted in ongoing friction between Mr. Orvis and Mayor Sanderson. [R. 500, p. 91.] 
The fact Mr. Orvis was singled out because of his political stance and the ongoing 
friction between him and Mayor Sanderson is corroborated by the fact the investigation 
was initiated and directed by Mayor Sanderson and other City officials. [R. 500, pgs. 
209-11,219-21.] It is further corroborated by three separate statements made by the 
City's new mayor - Mayor Jim Danklief- relative to the criminal charges against Mr. 
Orvis. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277.] On three separate occasions, Mayor Danklief said the 
criminal charges would be dropped if Mr. Orvis would resign from the Planning 
Commission. [Id.] 
First, on January 30, 2002, Mr. Orvis called Mayor Danklief to inquire as to 
whether Mayor Danklief would help Mr. Orvis resolve the criminal citation, as Mayor 
Danklief had offered to do in a prior telephone conversation. [R. 80.] Mayor Dankelief s 
response to Mr. Orvis's inquiry was: 
The idea was that they wanted you off the Planning Commission and that's 
the direction that we went Before I would have said, Okay now, Vic's 
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willing to, a, accept the Council's decision that he's not going to be on the 
Planning Commission in which case for the business license deal, you 
know, and so now that's gone . . . . 
[14] 
Second, a Deseret News article on July 8, 2002 stated that Mayor Danklef "said 
the city offered to drop the charges against Orvis if he agreed to resign in his third year as 
a planning commissioner, a four-year post. Orvis refused." [R. 277.] 
Third, on August 1, 2002, Mr. Orvis called Mayor Danklief to discuss Mr. Orvis's 
upcoming court appearance, during which the following exchange took place: 
Mayor Danklief: . . . If you're talking about me offering you a deal, I have 
that... I have that right. You wouldn't take the deal, Vic. 
* * * 
Mr. Orvis: But. . . I understood [the deal] to mean, if I'll get off the 
Planning Commission, you'll take care of the tickets and give me my 
business license and I'll go on my way. 
Mayor Danklief: You're exactly right. 
*** 
Mr. Orvis: [Y]ou can't make [the deal] based on whether I will get off or 
stay on the Planning Commission. 
Mayor Danklief: Okay, now let me explain I . . . went that direction 
because at that time, you had these charges against you. If you would have 
gone ahead [and] been inspected, got your business license, got off the 
Planning Commission, You're [sic] problems would have been over. 
[R. 76-77.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Orvis's motion to 
dismiss, reverse Mr. Orvis's conviction and dismiss this case. 
Under the equal protection provisions of both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, persons similarly situated must be treated similarly. U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 24; Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). As a 
corollary to this principle, a criminal conviction is invalid if state or local officials 
selectively enforced the ordinance under which the defendant was convicted in violation 
of the defendant's equal protection rights. Gibson v. Superint. of New Jersey. 411 F.3d 
427, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2005). 
To establish a selective enforcement claim in violation of a defendant's equal 
protection rights, the defendant must establish two elements: (1) when compared with 
others similarly situated, the state intentionally treated him differently; and (2) such 
selective treatment was either (a) irrational and wholly arbitrary, or (b) based on 
animosity or ill-will toward the individual. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562, 
564 (2000); Boone v. Spurgess. 385 F.3d 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2004). 
Here, the record proves the City violated Mr. Orvis's constitutional equal 
protection rights by selectively enforcing the Ordinance against him. The clear weight of 
the evidence shows the City intentionally treated Mr. Orvis differently than others who 
were similarly situated and such selective treatment was both irrational and wholly 
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arbitrary and motivated by City officials' animosity toward him. The 35 people from the 
list of 300 who did not apply for a license until after the City's August 3, 2001 deadline, 
including Mr. Orvis, were similarly situated. [R. 279; R. 292-309; R. 448, Ex. 4.] The 
City treated Mr. Orvis differently than the rest of the 35 by, among other things, 
criminally citing, prosecuting and fining only Mr. Orvis. [R. 279; R. 292-309; R. 312; R. 
385; R. 500, p. 206.] The City's disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis was intentional; indeed, 
it was part of a deliberate campaign of official harassment directed at ousting him from 
the City's Planning Commission. [R. 196; R. 448, Ex. 8; R. 500, pgs. 209-11, 219-22, 
229.] There is no legitimate rational basis for the City's disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis; 
the City's disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis was motivated by City officials' animosity 
toward him for the political views he expressed while he was a member of the City's 
Planning Commission. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277; R. 312.] 
The district court's legal conclusion that Mr. Orvis did not establish a prima facie 
case of selective enforcement is incorrect because the clear weight of the evidence 
established a claim of selective enforcement in violation of Mr. Orvis's constitutional 
right to equal protection of the law. The district court, in fact, applied the wrong legal 
standard to determine whether Mr. Orvis satisfied the second-prong of his selective 
enforcement claim, requiring Mr. Orvis to prove the City's actions were "invidious or in 
bad faith and w[ere] based on impermissible considerations such as . . . the desire to 
prevent the exercise of constitutional rights." [R. 390.] The district court's application of 
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its findings to its legal conclusion, moreover, was incorrect, because the district court (a) 
failed to enter findings that would support either prong of both his erroneous legal 
standard and the correct legal standard, [R. 390-95], and (b) the primary finding entered 
by the district court (finding # 2), on its face, contradicts the district court's legal 
conclusion because it recognizes that another person in the exact (not just similar) 
position as Mr. Orvis was neither cited nor fined. [R. 303; R. 394; R. 448, Ex. 7.] Even 
if the district court's findings could somehow be stretched to support the legal conclusion, 
those findings are clearly erroneous. Mr. Orvis has properly marshaled all the evidence in 
support of those findings, infra at pgs. 30-32, and can plainly demonstrate the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support those findings, those findings are patently misleading and 
those findings are contrary to the clear weight of evidence in the record. 
Finally, this Court should apply a less deferential standard than "clearly erroneous" 
to the findings of fact because (1) those findings are not the district court's; they are the 
City's partisan findings, Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); 
Bover Co. v. LignelL 567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977); and (2) those findings are 
insufficiently detailed to allow this Court to meaningfully review the district court's 
decision. State v. GenovesL 871 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The district court mechanically 
adopted the City's proposed findings verbatim without giving any direction to the City, 
without considering Mr. Orvis's objections, and without making any findings of its own. 
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[R. 128; R. 374-76; R. 389; R. 394-415; R. 501, pgs. 346-50.] Further, the findings 
entirely fail to disclose the steps by which the district court reached its conclusion that the 
City did not selectively enforce the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis. [R. 390-95.] 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY VIOLATED MR. ORVIS'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS 
WHEN THE CITY SELECTIVELY ENFORCED ITS ORDINANCE 
AGAINST HIM. 
The City intentionally treated Mr. Orvis differently than those who were similarly 
situated by selectively enforcing the Ordinance against him, and such selective treatment 
was arbitrary, wholly irrational and based on the City's animosity toward him. The City's 
selective enforcement, contrary to the district court's erroneous factual findings and legal 
conclusions, violated Mr. Orvis's equal protection rights under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. As a consequence, his criminal conviction must be reversed and this case 
dismissed. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits 
states from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
similarly mandates that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24. These two provisions embody the same guarantee of equal 
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protection of the laws,15 that is, "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, 
and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances 
were the same."16 Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). 
Courts have long recognized the equal protection guarantee extends to individuals 
who allege no specific class membership but are nonetheless subjected to invidious 
discrimination at the hands of government officials. E.g.. LeClair v. Saunders. 627 F.2d 
606, 608-10 (2d Cir. 1980). The United States Supreme Court has expressly authorized 
claims brought by a "class of one," where an individual does not claim to be part of any 
particular class, but claims to have been intentionally treated differently than those 
similarly situated. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000). 
For an individual to establish a prima facie case of "class of one" selective 
enforcement, the individual must satisfy a two-part test. Id. First, the individual must 
show that, when compared with others similarly situated, the state intentionally treated the 
individual differently. See kL Second, the individual must demonstrate that such 
selective treatment was either (a) irrational and wholly arbitrary, or (b) based on 
15The purpose of the equal protection guarantee "is to secure every person within 
the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether 
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly 
constituted agents." Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
l6
"Utah's uniform operation of laws provision is at least as exacting and, in some 
circumstances more rigorous than the standard applied under the federal constitution." 
Anderson v. Provo City Corp.. 2005 UT 5, f 17, 108 P.3d 701, 707 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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animosity or ill-will toward the individual.17 Id; Boone v. Spurgess. 385 F.3d 923, 932 
(6th Cir. 2004); Lunini v. Graveb. 395 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2005). If the individual 
demonstrates "he was subjected to selective enforcement in violation of his Equal 
Protection rights, his conviction will be invalid." Gibson v. Superint. of New Jersey. 411 
F.3d 427, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2005). 
A. The City Intentionally Treated Mr. Orvis Differently than Others Who 
were Similarly Situated. 
The district court's legal conclusion that Mr. Orvis did not establish a prima facie 
case showing the City intentionally treated him differently than others similarly situated is 
incorrect as a matter of law. It is contrary to the clear weight of evidence in the record, it 
is contrary to the district court's own findings, and it is based on findings that are clearly 
erroneous. 
There is no bright-line test for determining whether individuals are similarly 
situated. See Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v, Rhode Island Housing Corp.. 246 F.3d 1, 8 
(1st Cir. 2001). As a general guideline, however, the people at issue need not be 
17Utah courts have never squarely addressed the contours of a selective 
enforcement claim under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. See Patterson v. 
American Fork City. 2003 UT 7,1fll 29-34, 67 P.3d 466; Herman v. State, 821 P.2d 457, 
458 (Utah 1991); Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391, 395-96 (Utah 1964). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated such a claim under Utah law would be 
sufficient if the individual demonstrates "there is an intentional and deliberate plan on the 
part of state officials to enforce the law selectively against them." Herman, 821 P.2d at 
458. This is essentially the same test that is applied under the first-prong of the test set 
forth in Olech and its progeny. 
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identical, but must be similar in all "relevant aspects." Id. at 8. The question "is whether 
a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly 
equivalent." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Smith. 231 
F.3d 800, 810 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing that, relative to selective prosecution, persons 
are similarly situated when they engage in the same type of conduct, commit the same 
crime in substantially the same manner, and the evidence is equally as strong). 
The clear weight of the evidence demonstrated the City intentionally treated Mr. 
Orvis differently from all others similarly situated. 
The individuals who were similarly situated were the 35 people, including Mr. 
Orvis, who were on the Tax list, were on the list of 300, did not file an application by 
August 3, 2001, and continued to do business without a license. The 35 were all engaged 
in the same type of conduct: operating a business without a license from at least February 
27,2001 to whenever they actually received a license. [R. 279; R. 292-309.] With regard 
to each of the 35, the evidence that they were operating a business without a license was 
equally as strong: they were all on the Tax list, on the City's list of 300, and ultimately 
applied for a business license. [Id.; R. 281-90; R. 448, Ex. 4.] They were all subject to 
the same compliance requirements: submit a completed application for a business license 
by August 3, 2001. [R. 448, Ex. 4.] They all failed to file an application by August 3, 
2001 and were all subject to the same potential penalties for non-compliance: a Class B 
misdemeanor. [14; R. 292-309.] 
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Even though Mr. Orvis was similarly situated to the rest of the 35, the City treated 
him differently. He was the only one who was criminally cited and prosecuted. [R. 279; 
R. 292-309; R. 312; R. 500, p. 206.] He was the only one required to pay $1,500.00 in 
fines and fees. [R. 306; 312; R. 385.] He was the only one who was ordered to cease and 
desist doing business for approximately 15 months or face further criminal charges. [R. 
292-309; R. 312.] He was the only one who the City attempted to thoroughly investigate, 
including by inspecting his entire property and examining his business dealings. [R. 500, 
pgs. 187,229.] He was the only one who was visited by a police officer relative to such 
an inspection/search. [R. 500, pgs. 188-89, 223.] He was the only one (other than 
Gaylords who was neither cited nor fined) whom the City failed to grant or deny his 
business application. [R. 292-309; R. 312; R. 500, pgs. 17, 91-92.] 
Furthermore, the City's selective treatment of Mr. Orvis was intentional. Mr. 
Limb testified that City officials, including Mayor Sanderson, specifically requested him 
to inspect Mr. Orvis property because they believed he "was doing business more than a 
Minor Home Occupation." [R. 500, pgs. 209-11, 219-22.] He further testified it was 
unusual for the mayor to request him to inspect a premise simply for a business license 
application. [R. 500, p. 222.] Before the inspection took place, an internal police 
memorandum singled Mr. Orvis out for committing an "illegal business/zoning 
violation." [R. 196.] After the inspection, Mr. Limb wrote the City Prosecutor a letter 
solely focused on the investigation Mr. Limb was going to undertake in order to gather 
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more evidence against Mr. Orvis, [R. 448, Ex. 8], an effort which Mr. Limb had never 
undertaken before or since. [R. 500, p. 229.] Ultimately, the record demonstrated the 
City intentionally singled out Mr. Orvis for enforcement of the Ordinance as part of a 
deliberate plan to prematurely oust him from the Planning Commission. [R. 76-77; R. 80; 
R. 277; R. 312; R. 500, p. 91.] 
The district court's findings of fact do nothing to alter the conclusion that the City 
intentionally treated Mr. Orvis differently from others similarly situated. First, the district 
court's only relevant finding of fact,18 on its face, is contrary to and insufficient to support 
his conclusion that the City did not treat Mr. Orvis differently. Finding # 2 states: 
On July 19, 2001, a letter was sent by the Pleasant Grove Business 
Licensing Department to 300 residents who either had a business registered 
with the State or who had paid sales tax to the State of Utah, but did not 
have a Pleasant Grove business license. Mr. Orvis was included in this 
mailing. Eighty-five residents who were sent the letter, including Mr. 
Orvis, did not comply with the instructions contained in the letter 
regarding obtaining a Pleasant Grove business license. A second 
notification was sent by Pleasant Grove Community Development. 
18The district court's finding # 5, [R. 394], which states that "Mr. Orvis knew that 
he was not operating a minor home occupation business," is contrary to the clear weight 
of the evidence and is not relevant to this issue. Mr. Orvis was neither cited nor 
prosecuted for filing an incorrect business license application; he was cited and 
prosecuted for operating a business without a license. The district court's finding # 6, 
[id.], which states that "Mr. Orvis continued to operate as a major home occupation 
business even after he applied for the minor home occupation permit," is also not relevant 
to this issue. Again, Mr. Orvis was neither cited nor prosecuted for continuing to do 
business after applying for a license; he was cited and prosecuted for operating a business 
without a license, period. In fact, all five counts on which he was found guilty were for 
operating a business without a license between November 1999 and March 2001, well 
before he applied for a license. [R. 20-21.] 
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After the second notification, with the exception of Mr. Orvis and one 
other person, all the other persons and businesses came into 
compliance with the Pleasant Grove business license codes. 
[R. 394 (emphasis added).] 
This finding is contrary to the district court's legal conclusion because it explicitly 
finds "one other person" also did not comply with the City's ordinance. [Id.] That one 
other person, Gaylords' owner, was not only similarly situated to Mr. Orvis, but was in 
the exact position as Mr. Orvis. Gaylords was on the Tax list, was on the list of 300, and 
was operating a business without a license. [R. 303; R. 448, Ex. 7.] Gaylords filed an 
application for a home occupation permit to do automotive repairs, which was rejected by 
the City. [Id.] Gaylords never received a license and continued to do business. [R. 394.] 
Yet, Gaylords' owner, unlike Mr. Orvis, was not cited, prosecuted or fined. [R. 303; R. 
448, Ex. 7.] 
The district court's finding, moreover, wholly fails to: (a) determine whether or 
not the City's disparate treatment of that "one other person" and Mr. Orvis, or the City's 
disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis relative to the rest of the 35, was intentional; and (b) 
determine which group of people, if any, were similarly situated to Mr. Orvis. Thus, the 
district court's legal conclusion on this issue is erroneous as a matter of law. 
Second, even assuming finding # 2 would be sufficient to support the district 
court's legal conclusion, which it is not, that finding is clearly erroneous. The sum total 
of evidence arguably supporting finding # 2 is: (1) on July 19, 2001, the City sent a letter 
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to 300 residents, including Mr. Orvis, who had paid sales tax to the state but who did not 
have a business license, [R. 128; R. 279; R. 448, Ex. 4]; (2) three people from the list of 
300 applied for a business license by August 3, 2001, [R. 305-07]; (3) five people from 
the list of 300 applied for a business license on August 22, 2001, [R. 301; R. 305-08]; (4) 
Mr. Orvis applied for a minor home occupation license on August 23, 2001, [R. 448, Ex. 
6; R. 500, p. 90]; (5) one other person from the list of 300 applied for a business license 
on the same day, [R. 304.]; (6) eighty-five people from the list of 300 did not respond to 
or could not be reached by the City by August 29, 2001, [R. 279; R. 500, p. 73]; (7) 
twenty-three people from the list of 300 applied for a business license between September 
5, 2001 and November 8, 2001, [R. 293-96; R. 299-302; R. 305-09]; (8) on November 21, 
2001, the date on which Mr. Orvis was criminally cited for operating a business without a 
license, the City had not granted or denied Mr. Orvis's business license application, [R. 
132; R. 448, Ex. 2; R. 500, pgs. 17, 91-92, 97]; (9) on November 21, 2001, the date on 
which Mr. Orvis was criminally cited for operating a business without a license, five 
other individuals from the list of 300 who were operating a business without a license had 
failed to apply for and/or receive a business license, [R. 293; R. 298-99; R. 303]; (10) 
three of those five did not apply for a license until sometime during 2002, [R. 293; R. 
298; R. 303]; (11) only one person other than Mr. Orvis, Gay lords' owner, failed to 
receive a business license by the end of 2001 despite having applied for one during 2001, 
[R. 303; R. 448, Ex. 7]; and (12) all people from the list of 300, except for Mr. Orvis and 
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Gaylords' owner, either applied for and were granted a business license by May 2002, 
applied for and were granted a license at some unidentified time, were not in violation of 
the City's ordinance for various reasons, did not respond to the City, or the City was 
unable to locate them. [R 279; R. 292-309; R. 448, Ex. 7.] 
Even viewed in a light most favorable to the district court, this evidence is 
insufficient to support finding # 2 in several material respects. The City Prosecutor 
admitted, and the record established, that Mr. Orvis was not part of the 85 residents who 
"did not comply with the instructions contained in the letter" - yet he was criminally cited 
and prosecuted when the other 85 were not. [R. 279; R. 500, p. 72-73.] Additionally, the 
record contains no evidence that Mr. Orvis received a second notification, and there is 
substantial evidence to the contrary. [R. 132; R. 135; R. 137; R. 279.] 
More importantly, the finding that everyone from the list of 300 "came into 
compliance" except "Mr. Orvis and one other person" is materially misleading. It is true 
that by May 2002, [R. 303], (approximately 5 months after Mr. Orvis was criminally 
cited, [R. 5]), everyone from the list of 300, except Mr. Orvis and Gaylords' owner, had 
received a business license or were otherwise not in violation of the City's ordinance. [R. 
279; R. 292-309; R. 448, Ex. 7.] It is also true, however, that 28 people from the list of 
300 who were operating a business without a license did not apply for a license until after 
Mr. Orvis applied on August 23, 2001. [R. 293-96; R. 299-302; R. 305-09.] Additionally, 
35 people from the list of 300, including Mr. Orvis, did not apply for a license until after 
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the August 3,2001 deadline imposed by the City's July 19,2001 form letter. [R. 301; R. 
304-08.] None of these people "complied" with the City's ordinance until weeks, and in 
some cases months, after the August 3, 2001 deadline, yet only Mr. Orvis was criminally 
cited and prosecuted. [R. 293-96; R. 299-302; R. 304-09; R. R. 448, Ex. 4.] 
In addition, the record established Mr. Orvis substantially complied with the City's 
July 19, 2001 letter. Although he did not apply by the August 3, 2001 deadline, he was 
the ninth or tenth person from the list of 300 to apply for a business license, [R. 292-309; 
R. 312], he applied prior to Mrs. Emery's compilation of her non-compliance list, [R. 
279], he was not on Mrs. Emery's non-compliance list, [R. 279; R. 500, p. 72-73], and he 
was not on any of the City's other lists of applications that were questionable or on hold. 
[R. 448, Ex. 7.] Indeed, he was on the City's list of applications waiting for approval. 
04] 
Although he did not have a business license at the time he was cited, it was not 
because of any failure to apply, but because his application had been neither granted nor 
denied; the City had simply sat on his application and failed to inform him that they 
considered his application to be incomplete. [R. 132; R. 279; R. 500, pgs. 17, 91-92, 196-
97.] In any event, Mr. Orvis was not cited and prosecuted for failing to come into 
compliance; he was cited and prosecuted for violations of the Ordinance that occurred 
even before the City's July 19, 2001 form letter, [R. 20-21], a time during which all 35 
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were operating a business without a license.19 [R. 279.] 
B. The City's Selective Treatment of Mr, Orvis was Irrational and Wholly 
Arbitrary and was Based on the City's Animosity Toward Mr. Orvis. 
The district court's legal conclusion that Mr. Orvis did not establish a prima facie 
case showing the City's actions were in bad faith and based on the desire to prevent the 
exercise of constitutional rights is incorrect as a matter of law because the district court 
applied the wrong standard of law, there are no findings to support that conclusion and, 
had the district court applied the right standard of law, the clear weight of evidence in the 
record required the district court to find the City's selective enforcement was irrational 
I9Assuming finding of fact # 5 is relevant to this issue and would be sufficient to 
support the district court's legal conclusion, that finding is also clearly erroneous. 
Finding # 5 states: "At the time [Mr. Orvis] filed his August 2001 minor home 
occupation application, Mr. Orvis knew that he was not operating a minor home 
occupation business, but rather a major home occupation business." [R. 394 (emphasis 
added).] The only evidence arguably in support of this finding is: (a) Mr. Orvis, as a 
former member of the Planning Commission, was familiar with the City's code, [R. 500, 
pgs. 88, 114]; and (b) Mr. Orvis testified that, as of August 2001, the business activity for 
Design Fabricators "could be construed as a major home occupation." [R. 377-78.] 
Viewed in a light most favorable to the district court, this evidence is insufficient 
to support finding # 5. The mere fact Mr. Orvis agreed that, looking back, Design 
Fabricators' activity "could be construed as a major home occupation," does not mean 
Mr. Orvis knew Design Fabricators' was a major home occupation at the time he filed his 
application. Furthermore, Mr. Orvis testified at length that he did not know whether 
Design Fabricators was a minor or major home occupation when he applied in August 
2001 because prototype development was only about 10% of his business and the other 
90% of his business was done on a computer, but that he was willing to forego the 
prototype development if that meant the City would grant him a minor home occupation 
permit. [R. 354-58; R. 500, pgs. 87-89, 112-13.] Indeed, the City's business licensing 
official, Mrs. Emery, testified that neither she nor Mr. Orvis knew for certain whether he 
was a major or minor home occupation. [R. 500, pgs. 141-42.] 
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and wholly arbitrary and based on the City's animosity and ill-will toward Mr. Orvis. 
The United States Supreme Court in Olech established the requirements for 
proving a "class of one" equal protection claim. The individual must prove: (1) she was 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and (2) such action was 
either irrational and wholly arbitrary or based on animus or ill-will. Olech. 528 U.S. at 
564-65; accord Wojcik v. Massachusetts State Lottery Comm'n. 300 F.3d 92, 104 (1st 
Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Burke. 256 F.3d 93, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Eichenlaub 
v. Township of Indiana. 385 F.3d 274, 286-87 (3rd Cir. 2004); Tri County Paving. Inc. v. 
Ashe County. 281 F.3d 430, 439 (4th Cir. 2004); Boone v. Spurgess. 385 F.3d 923, 932 
(6th Cir. 2004); Lunini v. Graveb. 395 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2005); Barstad v. Murray 
County. 420 F.3d 880, 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2005); Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg. 375 
F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004); but see Jennings v. City of Stillwater. 383 F.3d 1199, 
1210-12 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring proof of animus). Utah courts have not addressed the 
second-prong of the Olech test in a case involving a "class of one" equal protection claim 
based on selective enforcement of a criminal law, such as Mr. Orvis's claim.20 However, 
20In Patterson v. American Fork City. 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d 466, the Utah Supreme 
Court only addressed a civil equal protection claim based on local zoning laws. IdL at fflf 
33-34. The Utah Supreme Court imposed a requirement (not an alternative basis) that in 
"run-of-the-mill zoning cases," the plaintiff must prove animus, relying on Justice 
Breyer's concurring opinion in Olech. Id. at f 34; Olech. 528 U.S. at 566 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). Patterson should be limited to the claim and facts before it, particularly 
since that requirement is contrary to the standard established by the United States 
Supreme Court for Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims and relies on Seventh 
Circuit authority that is no longer the law in the Seventh Circuit. See Lunini. 395 F.3d at 
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Utah courts are bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation and 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Mares v. 
Hill 222 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1950). 
To demonstrate that state action lacks a rational basis under the second-prong of 
the test, an individual must establish "the varying treatment of different groups or persons 
is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the 
court] can only conclude that the [government's] actions were irrational." Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents. 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (quoting Vance v. Bradley. 440 U.S. 93, 97 
(1979)) (alterations in the original); Bower v. Vill. of Mount Sterling. 44 Fed. Appx. 670, 
677, 678 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiffs allegations of Mayor's retaliation in 
manipulation of police hiring process due to plaintiffs family ties sufficient to state a 
"class of one" equal protection claim where allegations, if true, would demonstrate a lack 
of rational basis). 
To demonstrate the alternative basis under the second prong of the test - a state's 
action was motivated by animus or ill-will - evidence that the selective treatment was 
768 (stating the current rule under Seventh Circuit law); Nevel v. Schaumburg. 297 F.3d 
673, 681 (7th Cir. 2002) (same). Even assuming arguendo that animus is a requirement 
(not just an alternative basis) under Olech, the record demonstrated the City's actions 
were based on its animus toward Mr. Orvis and there is no contrary finding. See infra . 
Moreover, the Court should not impose such a requirement under Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution, because such a requirement would be contrary to the plain 
language of that provision. Article I, Section 24 mandates that no law can be non-
uniformly applied, and does not make any reference that such non-uniform application be 
based on the animus of those applying the law. See infra at p. 43 n.23. 
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motivated by a local official's animosity toward the individual is sufficient. Esmail v. 
Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff could prevail by proving 
the state's unequal treatment was the result of a "vindictive campaign by the mayor"). A 
local official's animosity toward the individual may be proved by evidence of a campaign 
of official harassment directed against the individual. Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 
394 F.3d 836, 849 (10th Cir. 2005). 
For example, in Mimics, the plaintiffs were operating a business out of a 
condominium complex in violation of the local building code. 394 F.3d at 839. Their 
landlord, who was a member of the village's planning and zoning commission, told the 
plaintiffs the commission had approved the business without any waiver or variance. Id. 
In late 1996, their landlord, with whom the plaintiffs were socially and politically allied, 
became a member of the village council and was politically opposed to two members of 
the village council. Id. Around the same time, a building inspector, who was allied with 
the two village council members, conducted two warrantless searches of the plaintiffs' 
business. Id. at 839-40. Ultimately, the building inspector reported the building code 
violations to state authorities who subsequently inspected the business, and the village 
commission gave the plaintiffs' business six months to remain in the condominiums. Id. 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed suit against the village, the inspector, and the two council 
members, alleging, in part, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 841. 
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The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the 
equal protection claim and, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. IcL at 849. The Tenth 
Circuit found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' "descriptions of [the inspector's] conduct and 
other evidence of his behavior indicate that [the inspector] was conducting a 'campaign of 
official harassment directed against [the plaintiffs] out of sheer malice.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). The Tenth Circuit further elaborated: 
Both [plaintiffs] describe angry confrontations with [the inspector] during 
the inspections. The selective targeting of [the business] is arguably the 
direct result of the [plaintiffs] support of a political faction on the Village 
Council. Having determined that there is evidence that the entries by [the 
inspector] were objectively unreasonable, we view [the inspector's] 
reporting of [the business's] potential code violations to government 
officials as part of his overall conduct. At this stage of the litigation, the 
[plaintiffs] have thus presented sufficient evidence that the whole of [the 
inspector's] conduct was motivated by political spite and that the 
[plaintiffs] were treated differently than others similarly situated. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the clear weight of the evidence established that the City's selective 
treatment of Mr. Orvis was irrational and wholly arbitrary, as well as motivated by the 
City's political spite toward him. While at least 35 people from the list of 300 continued 
to operate a business without a license after the August 3, 2001 deadline, Mr. Orvis was 
the only individual who: (1) was criminally cited and prosecuted, [R. 279; R. 292-309; R. 
312; R. 500, p. 206]; (2) was required to pay anywhere close to $1,500.00 in fines and 
fees, [R. 306; 312; R. 385]; (3) was ordered to cease and desist doing business for 
approximately 15 months or face further criminal charges, [R. 292-309; R. 312]; (4) had 
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property and business dealings that were subjected to a thorough inspection/search, [R. 
500, pgs. 187, 229]; (5) was visited by a police officer relative to such an 
inspection/search, [R. 500, pgs. 188-89, 223; R. 501, p. 260]; (6) the City failed to grant 
or deny his business application (except for Gaylords who was not cited or fined), [R. 
292-309; R. 312; R. 500, pgs. 17, 91-92]; and (7) the City cited without first giving notice 
that the City considered the business not to be in compliance with the person's business 
license application. [R. 500, p. 196-97.] There is simply no legitimate reason why Mr. 
Orvis was treated differently than the rest of the 35. Indeed, the City's treatment of 
Gaylords - who was identically situated with Mr. Orvis - punctuates that conclusion. [R. 
303; R. 448, Ex. 7.] 
The district court did not consider whether the City's treatment was irrational and 
wholly arbitrary because it applied the wrong legal standard. See infra at pgs. 42-43. 
Moreover, none of the district court's factual findings support the conclusion there was a 
rational basis for the City's selective treatment of Mr. Orvis. Finding # 2 does not 
provide the support necessary for such a conclusion. Specifically, finding #2: (1) on its 
face, recognizes Mr. Orvis was not the only one who did not comply with the Ordinance; 
(2) is clearly erroneous because there is insufficient evidence supporting it; (3) is 
materially misleading to the extent it finds everyone else complied; (4) is materially 
misleading to the extent it finds Mr. Orvis failed to comply; and (5) is a red-herring 
because Mr. Orvis was not cited and prosecuted for failing to come into compliance; he 
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was cited and prosecuted for operating a business without a license at a time when the rest 
of the 35 were also operating businesses without licenses. See supra at pgs. 13, 30-34. 
In any event, as a matter of public policy, no state or local entity should be allowed 
to use its own refusal to grant or deny an individual's business license application, or 
refusal to even give the individual notice there were questions relative to the application, 
as a rational basis for its criminal citation and prosecution of that individual for failure to 
have the business license for which the individual applied. 
Finding # 5 likewise provides no support: (1) finding # 5 is a red-herring because 
Mr. Orvis was neither cited nor prosecuted for filing an incorrect business license 
application; (2) finding # 5 is clearly erroneous because there is insufficient evidence to 
establish Mr. Orvis knew he filed an incorrect application; (3) Gaylords' owner also filed 
an incorrect business license application and was neither cited nor fined; and (4) Mr. 
Orvis's August 23, 2001 application cannot reach back and provide a rational basis for 
citing and prosecuting him for actions which all occurred on or prior to March 20, 2001. 
See supra at pgs. 12-14, 34 n.20. 
Finally, finding # 6 also fails to provide such support: (1) finding # 6 is a red-
herring because Mr. Orvis was neither cited nor prosecuted for operating a business 
without a license after he filed his application; (2) Gaylords' owner continued his 
automotive repair business without a license after filing an incorrect business license 
application; and (3) Mr. Orvis's actions after August 23, 2001 cannot reach back and 
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provide a rational basis for citing and prosecuting him for his actions which all occurred 
on or prior to March 20, 2001. See supra at pgs. 12-14. 
Moreover, regardless of whether there is factual support for a rational basis 
conclusion, the record separately and independently demonstrated the City's selective 
treatment of Mr. Orvis was motivated by City officials' animosity - "political spite" -
toward him. Mimics, 394 F.3d at 849; Esmail 53 F.3d at 179-80. The City implemented 
a deliberate plan to prematurely oust Mr. Orvis from his position on the Planning 
Commission because of the political stance he took on city-wide development while 
sitting on the Planning Commission. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277; R. 312; R. 500, p. 91.] As 
part of the plan, City officials conducted a vindictive campaign of official harassment 
against Mr. Orvis. They directed an inspector and police officer to conduct a thorough 
inspection/search of Mr. Orvis's property and an investigation of his business dealings in 
order to gather evidence to criminally cite and prosecute Mr. Orvis, something the City 
had never done before and has not done since to any similarly situated individual. [R. 
196; R. 500, pgs. 187-89, 209-11, 217-23, 229; R. 501, pgs. 260, 290-92.] And Mayor 
Danklief expressly acknowledged the criminal citation was a ruse to force Mr. Orvis off 
the Planning Commission. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 144-45; R. 277.] 
Furthermore, by its own terms, the district court's ruling only applied to a claim 
of "selective prosecution in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." [R. 392 
(emphasis added); R. 390-92.] However, Mr. Orvis raised, fully briefed and offered 
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substantial evidence in support of a claim for "selective enforcement." [E.g., R. 103-04; 
R. 144-46; R. 270-314.] Simply put, the district court either: (a) entirely failed to even 
address Mr. Orvis's selective enforcement claim, which, based on the substantial record 
created in support of such claim, constitutes grounds for reversal; or (b) concluded that 
selective enforcement and selective prosecution are one in the same, which they are not. 
Assuming the district court intended for its ruling to apply to both a claim for 
selective prosecution and a claim for selective enforcement, the legal standard utilized by 
the district court was erroneous as applied to selective enforcement. The district court 
stated that the second-prong of the selective prosecution test required that: "6[T]he 
defendant must prove that the government's selection of him for prosecution was 
invidious or in bad faith and was based on impermissible considerations such as . . . 
the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights.' [citation omitted] [United 
States v.] Furman. 31 F.3d [1034], 1037 [(10th Cir. 1994)]." [R. 390 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added.] 
That standard is erroneous because it applies only to claims of selective 
prosecution. This onerous standard is based on the substantial discretion afforded to 
prosecutors and the special burdens placed on defendants who challenge the prosecutors' 
discretion. [See R. 391-92.] Those considerations do not apply to a selective 
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enforcement claim.21 A "class of one" selective enforcement claim, in contrast, can be 
based on either of two independent grounds - the selective enforcement was irrational 
and wholly arbitrary or was motivated by animosity or ill-will.22 Olechu 528 U.S. at 564-
65. 
Both of those bases for Mr. Orvis's selective enforcement claim were put squarely 
before the district court prior to its ruling relative to selective prosecution. [E.g., R. 271 
("any 'unjustifiable' or arbitrary factor is simply not permitted"); id. ("defendant succeeds 
. . . if he establishes . . . the selective treatment was based upon . . . malicious or bad faith 
intent to injure a person"). The district court simply did not consider or address whether 
the City's selective treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary or whether such 
selective treatment was motivated by the City's animosity and ill-will toward Mr. Orvis. 
[R. 390-95.] Had the district court considered either alternative, rather than solely 
focusing on whether the City's actions were based upon the desire to prevent the exercise 
21Even under the inapplicable standard for selective prosecution, the evidence in 
this case would meet the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court. United States 
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (stating that "the decision whether to prosecute 
may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary 
classification'" (emphasis added)). 
22The district court's legal standard is also contrary to the plain language of Article 
I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which contains no requirement that the non-
uniform operation of laws be based on the desire to prevent the exercise of a 
constitutional right. Utah Const, art. I, § 24. Rather, operational uniformity requires that 
persons similarly situated be treated similarly, and the operation of a law is 
unconstitutionally non-uniform if it is found to treat similarly situated individuals in an 
unreasonably different fashion. State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, f 33, 114 P.3d 585, 593; 
State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995). 
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of a constitutional right, the clear weight of the evidence required the district court to find 
the City's selective treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary and was based on the 
City's animosity and ill-will toward Mr. Orvis. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD APPLY A LESS DEFERENTIAL STANDARD 
WHEN REVIEWING THE "DISTRICT COURT'S" FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The Court should apply a less deferential standard when it reviews the district 
court's factual findings because the district court mechanically adopted the City's partisan 
findings verbatim and because the findings fail to disclose the steps by which the district 
court reached its decision. 
An appellate court generally reviews factual findings for whether they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). A district court's finding 
is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made after 
reviewing all the evidence. In re R.L.I.. 771 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1989). Under this 
standard, an appellate court must resolve all disputes in the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the district court's determination. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 
1994). 
However, there is a sound basis for Utah appellate courts to apply a less deferential 
standard when reviewing a district court's factual findings that were mechanically 
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adopted verbatim from the prevailing party's proposed findings.23 Indeed, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in three separate cases, has indicated a less deferential standard may be 
appropriate in that circumstance. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 
1993) (leaving open the question of how the court would review mechanically adopted 
findings because the evidence demonstrated the findings were not mechanically adopted); 
Bover Co. v. Lignell 567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977) (stating a trial court should not 
"'mechanically adopt' the findings as prepared by the prevailing party"); Automatic 
Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman J., 
concurring) (stating he personally applied a less deferential standard when faced with 
mechanical adoptions, by feeling freer to disregard the findings in close cases); see also 
State v. James. 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding defendant had not 
rebutted presumption that findings were appropriately entered when nothing in record 
indicated the trial court failed to adequately deliberate on the findings); Whitear v. Labor 
Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982, 986-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding ALJ gave sufficient 
23
"Among the reasons given for disapproving of verbatim or mechanical adoption 
of findings are: (1) They leave doubt whether the district court has discharged its duty to 
review the evidence for itself and reached its own evaluation of the evidence rather than 
that of an advocate; (2) There is the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the 
part of the attorneys who prepare findings of fact; (3) Findings prepared by the court are 
more helpful to the appellate court; (4) Verbatim findings fail to . . . promote care on the 
part of the trial judge in carefully ascertaining the facts of the case; [and] (5) The use of 
verbatim findings may cause the losing litigants to conclude . . . that the federal courts [do 
not] decide cases carefully and impartially." 9 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice § 52.14[2] (3d. 2005). 
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guidance to the preparing party); 14 at 988 (Orme J., dissenting); State v. All Real Prop.. 
2001 UT App. 361,111, 37 P.3d 276 (holding there was no evidence of mechanical 
adoption).24 
This appeal squarely presents the opportunity for this Court to adopt a less 
deferential standard of review because the record incontrovertibly proves the findings 
here were mechanically adopted verbatim from the City's proposed findings.25 When the 
district court ruled from the bench and denied Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss, he gave no 
reasoning for his ruling. [R. 501, pgs. 346-47.] Nor did the district court give the City 
any real guidance relative to the City's preparation of the findings. [R. 501, p. 348.] 
24Indeed, other state and federal appellate courts have adopted less deferential 
standards to review mechanically adopted findings. See e ^ , Moore's, § 52.31 [9][b]; 
Andre v. Bendix Co.. 774 F.2d 786, 800 (7th Cir. 1985); Cal. Offset Printers. Inc. v. 
Hampton Int'l Commun.. Inc.. 1996 WL 490184, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1996); In re Las 
Colinas. Inc.. 426 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (1st Cir. 1970); Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 
708-09 (Ind. 2001); Clifford v. Klein. 463 A.2d 709, 711-13 (Me. 1983); Pedersonv. 
State. 649 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. 2002). 
25Factors courts have utilized to determine whether a district court mechanically 
adopted the prevailing party's findings include: (1) the district court requested proposed 
findings from only one of the parties; see Automatic Control. 780 P.2d at 1260; Clifford. 
463 A.2d at 711-12; Pederson. 649 N.W.2d at 164; (2) the district court requested the 
proposed findings without providing guidance as to his ruling; see Alta Indus.. 846 P.2d 
at 1286; Automatic Control. 780 P.2d at 1263-64 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Clifford. 
463 A.2d at 711-12; (3) the district court failed to entertain objections by the opposing 
counsel; see Bover. 567 P.2d at 1113-14; Clifford. 463 A.2d at 711-12; (4) the district 
court adopted findings that either contain more than de minimus typographical errors or 
are contrary to the court's decision or the record; see Automatic Control. 780 P.2d at 
1263-64 (Zimmerman J., concurring); James. 858 P.2d at 1015; Andre. 774 F.2d at 800; 
and (5) the findings are couched in partisan language; see Automatic Control. 780 P.2d at 
1264 (Zimmerman J., concurring); Clifford. 463 a.2d at 712. Each of those factors 
demonstrate the district court mechanically adopted the City's proposed findings. 
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Although the district court appeared to grant Mr. Orvis a chance to respond to the 
proposed findings either in writing or through oral argument, [id.], the district court 
signed the findings without first hearing Mr. Orvis's objections or reviewing his written 
objections. [R. 389; R. 396-415; R. 501, p. 350.] 
Moreover, the district court not only adopted the City's findings verbatim, [R. 388-
395], but the findings are absolutely couched in partisan language; both the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are copied substantially verbatim right out of the City's prior 
memoranda. [R. 128; R. 374-76; R. 394-95.] In addition, the findings which the district 
court adopted verbatim are legally insufficient, contrary to the record and, at times, are 
just plainly contradicted by the City's own admissions. See supra at pgs. 27-34. 
Separately and independently, this court should apply a less deferential standard to 
the district court's factual findings because they fail to disclose the steps by which the 
district court reached its conclusion that the City did not selectively enforce the Ordinance 
against Mr. Orvis. State v. GenovesL 871 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations 
omitted) (stating substantial deference is granted to the district court's findings of fact 
"only when the findings 'disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached'"); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-79 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (stating that conclusory findings "provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for 
the trial court's decision and render effective appellate review unfeasible"). 
For example, the district court made no factual finding relative to: (1) the group of 
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people, if any, who were similarly situated with Mr. Orvis; (2) whether Mr. Orvis was 
treated differently than those similarly situated; (3) whether the City's disparate treatment 
of Mr. Orvis was intentional; (4) whether the City had a rational basis to treat Mr. Orvis 
differently; or (5) whether the City's disparate treatment was motivated by animus or ill-
will. These findings were necessary to disclose the steps by which the district court 
reached its conclusion. 
The type of less deferential standard of review that should be applied to findings 
such as those in this case - Le^ , findings that were either mechanically adopted or which 
fail to disclose the steps by which the district court reached its conclusion - should 
include: (1) resolving disputes in the evidence in a light equally favorable to the district 
court's determination and the appellant's position, (2) only requiring the appellant to 
demonstrate the finding is against the weight of the evidence, or (3) some combination of 
(1) and (2). In addition, this court should generally perform a more critical review of the 
factual findings, taking into account the district court's lack of personal attention to the 
findings, and, in a close case, should disregard the findings altogether. Automatic 
Control 780 P.2d at 1264 (Zimmerman J., concurring); Cal. Offset Printers. 1996 WL 
490184, at *1; Moore's. § 52.31[9][b]. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's denial of 
Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss, reverse Mr. Orvis's conviction and dismiss this case. 
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DATED: November [0_, 2005. 
TOMSIC & PECK LLC 
'eggy A. Tomsic 
Kristopher S. Kaufm; 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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